State of Illinois ex rel. Leibowitz v. Family Vision Care, LLC
2019 IL App (1st) 180697 (Ill. App., 2019)Words & Phrases
Consumer Fraud ActTrial Judge
John C. GriffinAppellate Judge
HymanHolding
Under Insurance Claims Fraud Protection Act (740 ILCS 92/1 et seq.), a whistleblower or relator who has personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing is an “interested person” under the Act and need not have a personal injury to have standing.Fact Summary
We are asked to decide two interrelated questions under the Insurance Claims Fraud Protection Act (Act) (740 ILCS 92/1 et seq. (West 2016)): (i) whether the State can assign to a third party an injury to its sovereignty and (ii) whether the third party can derive standing from that injury absent monetary damages to the State? Both questions present an issue of first expression.
¶ 2 The trial court found the plaintiff, trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Marie Cahill, lacked standing because the State only suffered an injury to its sovereignty, not a pecuniary loss, and the State cannot assign an injury to its sovereignty to a private citizen. The court also found the plaintiff was not an “interested person” under the Act, as Cahill did not suffer an injury related to the claim and did not allege how determination of the controversy would affect a claim or right personal to her.
¶ 3 We differ with the trial court’s standing analysis. Under the plain language of the Act and its purpose in combating insurance fraud, the State need not have suffered monetary damages to confer standing on a relator. Moreover, in the qui tam context, a whistleblower employee like Cahill, who has personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing, is an “interested person” under the statute and need not have a personal injury to have standing.
¶ 4 We agree with the trial court that dismissal was not warranted by the separation agreement or for failure to state a claim. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.