Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan

701 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2012)

Words & Phrases

Duty To Defend: Civil Rights

Trial Judge

Honorable David Coar and Charles R. Norgle

Appellate Judge

Judge Kanne

Holding

Trigger of coverage for false arrest claim was date of conviction and for malicious prosecution or wrongful conviction claims was date of exoneration, when conviction was overturned, or when nolle prosequi order was entered.

Fact Summary

Trial court decision 761 F. Supp.2d 766

 

Trigger for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

, “the final element of the tort marks the occurrence” or trigger date, Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 480, and IIED claims are no different. But here, the appellants change course and argue that the injuries stemming from the IIED are continuous, and thus, we should apply a continuous trigger to that potential claim. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002) (“[W]here a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.”). Thus, under the ap­pellants’ continuous-trigger theory, any injuries Starks suffered from the IIED potentially trigger both North­field’s and St. Paul Fire’s policies. We disagree.

The appellants conflate continuing harmful acts with the continuing effects of one harmful act. “A continuing violation or tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003). To differentiate these concepts, Illinois courts must determine whether a “single overt act” is the cause of subsequent damages or whether the accused con­tinually perpetrated harmful acts. Id.

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